

THE DIMENSIONALITY OF NATIONS PROJECT Department of Political Science University of Hawaii

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RESEARCH REPORT NO. 60

PLAN FOR DESIGNING THE FUTURE

George Kent

January 1972



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The World Order Models Project of the World Law Fund has nearly concluded the first phase of its efforts to formulate improved designs for the world of the 1990s. Although eight teams of eminent scholars from all parts of the globe have worked on the project, a great deal remains to be done. Critical analysis of the procedures followed in that Project suggests a plan for guiding new efforts. Many individuals and groups, in the universities and elsewhere, should now begin participating in this design work. They can adapt the general plan to their own circumstances and to their own interests, and engage themselves in designing some limited aspect of the world order of the future.

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THE DIMENSIONALITY OF NATIONS PROJECT Department of Political Science University of Hawaii

PLAN FOR DESIGNING THE FUTURE

George Kent

ABSTRACT

The World Order Models Project of the World Law Fund has nearly concluded the first phase of its efforts to formulate improved designs for the world of the 1990s. Although eight teams of eminent scholars from all parts of the globe have worked on the project, a great deal remains to be down. Critical analysis of the procedures followed in that Project suggests a plan for guiding new efforts. Many individuals and groups, in the universities and elsewhere, should now begin participating in this design work. They can adapt the general plan to their own circumstances and to their own interests, and engage themselves in designing some limited aspect of the world order of the future.

PLAN FOR DESIGNING THE FUTURE

George Kent University of Hawaii January 1972

I. Introduction

This juncture in history is surely unique: we have become used to the idea of change, our attention is concentrated on the future as never before, and we feel a truly new sense of potential control over our own destinies. The idea of planning, choosing among alternative conceptions of the future and then building those we choose has become a potent force in our collective consciousness. Great technological achievements based on long range planning now suggest the possibility of comparably great achievements in the social, human world. So much is now, for the first time, seen as possible. We are working on the transition from an overriding sense of futility to a dominating sense of mastery.

And there are countercurrents. The skeptics who tell us it cannot be done remain with us, and help to assure the truth of their own prophecies. Of even greater concern are those who feel that mastery can be obtained and are afraid that it will be. With very good reason, they fear that control over our futures will be dreadfully misused to produce some sort of psychological and social tyronny. These critics point to the obscene uses to which technological achievements have been put, in great machines of destruction.

The fear is real and warranted. But what should be the response to that fear? The briefest reflection makes it evident that withdrawal will

not terminate the processes of planning and control; it only leaves it in the hands of others. The answer can only be that the pessimist should join the optimist and become thoroughly engaged in the design task itself, working to assure that the plan for the new world takes full account of the hopes and fears of each of them.

Thus, we must not be silent observers, watching while others take up the design task, hoping that they will be benevolent. They should be us, you and me. The design of the future is too important to leave to "experts." We will all have to live in it. We are all obligated to develop and press for our own views of what should be. We should all become architects of the future.

How should we go about it? The purpose of this essay is to suggest procedural guidelines which might be used by individuals or small groups in working toward the management of major social problems. Although the methods described could just as well be adapted to smaller-scale, local issues, the objective here is to show how we can take on the most ambitious task of all, designing the structure of global relations of the future.

These purposes are the same as those of the World Order Models Project undertaken by the World Law Fund. Working under the direction of Saul Mandlovitz, eight teams of scholars throughout the world have by now devoted many years of highly concentrated work on formulating proposals for the structure of global relations for the decade of the 1990s. First drafts of their proposals will soon be released for critical review.

Although these studies are sure to be of extremely ligh quality, to be realistic we should also acknowledge that these teams will not dispose

of the question. There will still be a great deal more planning and proposing, formulating and reformulating, to do. This project should be understood as WOMP I. The experience of that round of studies should be exploited as thoroughly as possible to provide insight to guide WOMP II, and to guide other, newly initiated design efforts.

The first World Order Models Project can be examined in terms of its products, through critical examination of the draft proposals which finally emerge from that effort. It can also be examined in terms of its process, the procedures that were used to arrive at those products. In this essay, I will examine the process, not the products. Rather than designing the future directly, we may be able to develop an improved plan for designing the future. The experience of WOMP I should help us to formulate that plan.

This essay proceeds in three major stages. First, the history of the World Order Models Project will be reviewed. Not having been involved in it, this review will help to reveal whatever misunderstandings I may have about the project. Second, I will make a variety of observations on what seem to have been strong or weak points in the methods that were used. Third, to provide a more coherent overview I will suggest an outline of procedures which might be followed in future world order models design efforts. This procedure will be framed in a form that could be used in the classroom and in other contexts as well.

II. History

An account of the World Order Models Project was provided by Ian Baldwin, Jr., in the January, 1970 issue of War/Peace Report, where he sketched out the general plan:

Together with Harry Hollins, who heads the Fund, Mendlovitz initiated the organization of eight nationally and regionally based research teams whose task is to formulate fully developed models or images of the world in the decade 1990 ...

Each team will submit a document of roughly 125 pages in which its model for a world order is delineated. Each document will be published in at least eight languages ... and distributed throughout the world ...

In effect, the document submitted by each team will be a model of the world order it prefers for the decade 1990. The procedural steps of world order thinking may be generalized roughly as follows: 1) close examination of the significant features of the present international system, including those trends that seem most portentous, 2) extention of the present system and its trends to the decade 1990, 3) description and hypothetical testing of alternative systems, 4) choice of an alternative system that best realizes world order values or goals, and 5) careful elucidation of transitional steps or strategies by which the present system can be changed to the preferred alternative.

The Project has focused its concern on the basic values of non-violence, economic welfare, and social injustice.

The eight teams and their Research Directors are:

- 1. Europe Carl Friedrich von Weisäcker
- 2. Letin America Horacio H. Godoy and Gustavo Lagos
- 3. Japan Yoshikazu Sakamoto
- 4. North America Richard A. Falk
- 5. India Rajni Kothari, B. S. Murty, and Pitambar Pant

 6. Russia E. Arab-Ogly Ison Bestumber Ison
- Russia E. Arab-Ogly, Igor Bestuzhev-Lada, and Lev
- Stepanov 7. Africa - Ali A. Mazrui
- 8. Transnational Johan Galtung

The Research Directors have met together about twice a year since 1968 to review their past work and to plan their future work.

For a more fine-grained examination it is useful to have a picture of the chronological development of the World Order Models Project. That cannot be provided in full detail, but the World Law Fund has very kindly permitted met to study some of the memoranda sent out by the Project Director, Saul Mendlowitz, to the research teams. The following sketch of some of the highlights is drawn from those memoranda. The first of them was sent out on October 19, 1967. Many deal with purely administrative matters, planning meetings, coordinating submissions of papers, suggesting reading material, and the like. Others, however, are of considerable interest because they articulate the agenda and the plan of action.

On December 20, 1967, a number of observations were made to help delimit the research problem faced by the research teams:

... our study of the future can be differentiated from other studies in the unique substantive focus we have chosen ... we are concerned directly with the elimination of war and the creation of tolerable conditions of world-wide economic welfare and social justice.

What may differentiate our work from others even more sharply however, is the fact that we are attempting to be much more explicit about the constitutive order of the world community. That is to say, we are concerned with the political-social-legal forms, organizations and institutions that will be relevant to the solution of the aforementioned problems. In saying this, I do not mean to impose upon any of the teams the necessity for developing a constitution of world order for the decade 1990. At the same time, I believe it is essential that we discuss in some detail, say on as concrete a level as Messrs. Clark & Sohn, the kinds of authoritative structure which will be needed and preferred, both during the transition period, as well as at the end of the 20th century.

I am not certain how best to go about implementing this latter idea. Perhaps one person should be appointed to deal with constitutional structure of a world authority,

and take up such matters as voting in the General Assembly, over the range of substantive issues with which we want to deal; or perhaps the team might want to work on the extent to which policial, social, economic and cultural processes converge, so as to produce efficient and humane formal authoritative structure ...

There is finally the simple point that for a subject to become part of our study of the future, it must be relevant to our question. For example, if one wishes to discuss world culture or individual aggression with regard to the problems of eliminating war and creating tolerable conditions of world-wide economic welfare and social justice, it is incumbent upon him to show what causal relationship exists between those subject matters and the solution to those problems.

It was suggested that one way of narrowing down the problem would be to set up "minimal and maximal goals." It was also emphasized in this December 20, 1967 note that "we are concerned with the creation of tolerable conditions of economic welfare and social justice, as we are with the elimination of war."

On March 26, 1968, the research teams were reminded that they were not supposed to work in isolation, but were expected to "undertake six to a dozen interviews with some elite figures in your society, dealing with their views of the world in the decade 1990." On July 11, it was explained that

The broad purpose of this interview is to find out whether it is possible to get meaningful responses from intelligent, articulate persons on now the world will look in the decade 1990. A more specific purpose is to get their views on what the international political system will look like vis-a-vis world order matters. To be even more specific, we would like their view of the extent to which the likelihood of international violence or war, will have decreased or increased, and to what extent minimum tolerable conditions of economic welfare and human rights will be present on a world-wide basis.

Finally, we want to get some sense of their preferred world, their best hunch on the prospects of it coming into being, some specificity with regard to the various transition processes or scenarios that will produce that world.

The following topics were suggested as possibly worth raising during the interviews:

non-proliferation arms control complete and general disarmament peacekeeping and international police forces the use of international organization and supra-national organizations of the future the viability and flexibility of the nation-state and the potential range of other actors. the notion of a common humanity cultural identity the relationship of law, order, social change, and revolution economic integration space exploration colonization of the ocean floor social justice

At the September, 1968 meeting of Research Directors, in addition to considerations of administrative matters, discussions were held on these topics:

World Culture and the Role of the Individual
Human and Social Rights as a World Order Problem
Relationship of Material and Spiritual Values in
connection with World Order Problems
Population Projections and World Order Problems
Science and Technology
Disarmament and Peacekeeping
Public Opinion Polling and Depth Interviewing

In early 1969 a new cross-national subgroup was formed to work on questions of "Economics and World Order," under the leadership of Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics at M.I.T. His group's task was to consider "the economic dimensions of the problem of devising an optimal world."

As Professor Bhagwati put it, "what we should be doing is to extrapolate the key economic variables into this future date, if the world were to evolve

in the way in which it seems to be evolving at the moment ... and then to contrast it with our optimal (or preferred) world, and then to work out ways in which we could get the evolution to shift towards the optimal world."

The regular research teams agreed to focus, at least for a time, on "Arms Policy for the Final Decades of the 20th Century," and each of them was asked to draft a position paper on that theme. In his memorandum of April 18, 1969 the Project Director suggested a veriety of related topics worthy of consideration, including these:

Non-proliferation Chemical and biological Weapons Outer Space The sea bed Inspection techniques Cut-off of production Technological break-through in arms development Control of conventional weapons Nuclear-free zones The role of the military in various governmental structures and policy making Likely sources of conflict over the next thirty years The relationship of collective security and/or international peacekeeping forces The development of institutionalized forms for pacific settlement of disputes

At the June, 1969 conference of Research Directors it was decided that the teams should focus their next two conferences on the constitution of world organizations (such as the UN), peacekeeping, transition devices, and on previously ignored worldwide problems such as environmental crises, alienation, and the like. This was reported in the September 26, 1969 memorandum, where the Project Director also reflected on transition strategies and their relationship to preferred worlds:

The reasoning which led to this sequence of discussion, first of preferred worlds and then transition devices, was based on the view that concern for strategies for transition makes sense only if we were prepared to state in rather precise fasion, the particular preferred world we would be recommending. This might appear to be selfevident, but it appears to me that a major set of theoretical and methodological difficulties in this field of war prevention, peace research and world order, has arisen from the failure to relate in a systematic and rigorous fashion, preferred worlds and recommendations for transition strategies ... On the other hand, scholars who work on short-run and intermediate problems in the world political system, frequently fail to articulate a precise vision of their preferred world. It thus is frequently not clear whether they are trying to reform the present system of international relations without altering the basic political processes or whether they assume that at some future date, a new system of international relations such as world government will emerge.

The memorandum also suggested some reading material relating to an unelaborated list of "some preferred worlds which have been suggested since 1945:"

Original United Nations
Tight bi-polar
Loose bi-polar
Regionalism
Condominium (Soviet Union and the United States)
Polycentrism (atomization, heightened nationalism)
Johan Galtung's world
George Ball's world
Pax Americana or world empire model
World Law

On August 7, 1969 the Project Director laid out a rough outline of the methodology to be followed, consisting of six major steps:

(1) First one engages in projections of the economic, political and social life of one's own region, perhaps with a set of varying assumptions, (e.g., the Japanese group who are working on the economic side, are doing projections of fourteen economies, including India, in which they are assuming three different states -- there

is more tension, less tension, and tension remains about the same as it is today).

- (2) Given these projections, what are the world order implications?
- (3) Given these world order implications, what are your preferences in terms of world order values?
- (4) What recommendations do you make for implementing the achievement of these preferences, both nationally and internationally?
- (5) What do you think will be the response of the rest of the world to your analyses, preferences, and recommendations?
- (6) Given these responses, what preferences and recommendations do you now make?

He also asked the teams to formulate specific questions, remarking

that:

One other way to state our problem from the viewpoint of actual research is to ask what are the questions the research groups will have to deal with in common, that is to say, what are the general questions, and what are the questions which necessarily must be answered as a result of unique regional context.

Comments made on September 17, 1969 suggested that the first methodological step, projecting trends, was really not so crucial as first assumed, and might even prove counterproductive:

I know that a lot of the national and regional projection work has not been done, and that it would be intellectually more tidy to have the trend work before going into world organization. Nevertheless, the methodology of stating a preferred world, and working back to the present system. is itself a very fruitful one, and if in the process of working back, one then is able to pick up those trend lines, there will be much greater clarity in both the strategy of transition to preferred worlds, and timese changes which you consider essential to make in the recommendations for a preferred world. In fact, my reason for pushing ahead in this area is precisely because I find that many of the recommendations for transition are fuzzy and ill-conceived, precisely because preferred worlds have not been spelled out in sufficient detail and comprehensiveness. And if we leave that task until such time as we have what we consider to be reliable trends, my own sense of it is that we are likely to suffer in the following way. The trends themselves, while they should exercise some constraint on our judgment, also tend to restrict our speculation and imagination. We need, in a peculiar way, to wrench ourselves from history and work backwards.

A number of questions for consideration were suggested on November 24, 1969 in preparation for the upcoming conference of Research Directors. The questions that were posed were these:

- (1) To what extent is the world development authority suggested by Messrs. Clark and Sohn ... a preferred world which you would recommend? If not, why not? Do you think the figure of Academician Sakharov of 20% of the gross national income of the northern industrial states to the southern tier of states is something you would recommend? What do you think of the voting procedure suggested by Messrs. Clark and Sohn?
- (2) To what extent are the ideal types of capitalism and cocialism heuristic models for this kind of an enterprise?
- (3) To what extent do we need an expansion of the International Monetary Fund so that there is a complete substitute for gold, more flexible monetary exchange rates, and/or a common currency?
- (4) To what extent will the scientific and technological revolution, especially in the computer, communication and transportation fields, revolutionize patterns of production and distribution?
- (5) What will be the relationship of trade, aid, whether in the form of grants or loans, taxes, etc., to some overall world economic scheme?
- (6) How much imbalance should we permit for various regional groupings in terms of economic welfare? To what extent should we attempt to meet some minimal per capita standard for all of humanity?

At the December 1969 conference of Research Directors it was decided that the teams should next prepare position papers on "Processes and Structures of Transition for World Order in the Decade 1990." Two different views on transition were identified and discussed in the February 16, 1970 memorandum:

It is impossible to deal with the question of transition without being concerned about transition to what. Two general solutions have been suggested.

The first (which we tended to call "terminal model" ..., but which I should like now to label "behavioral model") takes the position that one should work out a fairly specific and relatively concrete behavioral statement of the world we wish to achieve. The second position (which might be labelled an accommodation or learning theory model) postulates a set of goals of the sort agreed upon in our world order definition, but avoids designating in precise behavioral terms the particular organization or relationships which will achieve and maintain those goals.

The Project Director indicated that he favored precise specification of the ends that are to be sought, but also acknowledged that that might not be essential:

While my own position is that we need to make much more concrete ... our view of the world of 1990, it is not clear to what extent there would be differences in recommendations for a strategy of transition, vis-a-vis immediate steps for, let us say, the next five years, if one were to use one or the other model. It may very well be that there is complete congruence between those who desire, for example, a regionalist world order for the decade 1990 and those who feel that it is impossible to state that precisely the organizational or even world political interaction system for that decade.

It was made clear that if a world order model was to be designed, that design should be understood as intended for the decade of the 1990's, and not necessarily as a permanent world order, to remain the same for all time. A number of other observations were made on the problem of designing transition strategies:

We need some sense of the sequencing of recommendations, that is, what are likely next steps as opposed to steps and processes that will have to take place at some future time? ... To what extent does one conceive of the transition process as steadily progressive, as contrasted with

the possibility of a zigzag curve of progress, or even catastrophe, before genuine progress can be achieved?
... Too little attention has been given to evolving a strategy of transition in which both integrative and disintegrative forces are lealt with ... How conscious a process must and can transition be? ... It may be useful to at least speculate on the extent to which we need conscious planning, and the limitation of rational thought in providing solutions for social problems.

This long memorandum of February 17, 1970 was also used to list "a number of areas which probably have not been adequately covered in our work thus far." These were:

Human rights
Seabed
Space
Communication and transportation revolutions
Computer
Energy
Universalism, especially China, Germany and Korea
Environment -- pollution, resource depletion, population

On March 12, 1970 an attempt was made to clarify some of the terms that were being used. The major definitions provided were these:

utopia -- any social system which is qualitatively different from the present system.

relevant utopia -- a statement in relatively concrete behavioral terms of a model of world order capable of preventing organized international violence, and providing adequate worldwide economic welfare and social justice, and a similarly concrete behavioral statement of the transition from the present system to that model.

preferred world -- a statement of recommendations by a formulator who has, at least as a methodological matter, explored one relevant utopia.

Responding to questions and expressions of confusion that had been received from others, the Project Director explained:

Relevant utopia does not mean that a particular model or image of world order is politically feasible. Relevant utopia means rather, that both the image of the model we project and the transition processes are sufficiently described in behavioral terms so that the formulator and observer or reader has a reasonable basis for guaging the probability of emergence of such a model from the present system ... we consider as relevant any utopias ... so long as the probability of their realization can be stated in sufficiently behavioral terms.

Utopias were viewed as either positive or negative, the latter, like those of 1984 or Brave New World, described as dysutopias. The notion of free utopias, social systems imagined free of any constraints of practicality or feasibility, was also introduced.

The general methodology of world order models design was outlined by reference to these terms:

Preferred world thinking is the third step in the methodology of world order. Steps one and two involve exploring and stating utopias and relevant utopias, which ferret out basic values and goals to be achieved and the possibility of particular social processes and institutions for achieving those goals. Step three, based on this intensive investigation, involves the creation or selection by a proponent of a particular world, a preferred world.

After some weeks of stock-taking and review, on June 8, 1970 the Project Director expressed his judgment that "the work to date has concentrated mainly on diagnosis, and it is crucial for our undertaking that much more emphasis be given to prognosis and preference." He also commented on the importance of developing exciting, adventurous proposals which might capture the imaginations of people around the world, leading at the very least to a liberation from ordinary ways of thinking. And he came to another new insight:

We have probably underestimated the extent to which the presentation of a vivid and compelling image of a future world, capable of dealing with a set of interrelated world problems, is itself a part of the transition process. The fact that responsible intellectuals throughout the world seriously undertake the task of providing preferred worlds based on tools for understanding, comprehending and controlling the future, is itself a step in the transition to achieving that future ... the very act of attempting to state a creative and just future is an important ingredient in providing a climate in which transition steps can take place.

This interim review also produced the feeling that "we have grossly underestimated and understated the likely impacts -- whether for utopias or dysutopias -- of the technological revolution."

In June 1970 the Project Director prepared a revised Definition of World Order, the first version of which was prepared in March 1968 to provide an overall conceptual focus for the project. Because of its importance, the updated text is reproduced here in full. He also circulated two versions of his Matrix for Study of World Order, a simpler one which was first distributed in 1968, and a more complex, updated edition. These two forms are reproduced here, following the Definition.

In late 1971, the research teams began to circulte draft manuscripts among themselves for critical review, and they formulated plans for distributing their papers in the broader community to elicit discussion on the central themes of the World Order Models Project. Information on new developments will be published in the World Law Fund Progress Report, available on request from the World Law Fund, 11 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036.

DEFINITION OF WORLD ORDER

World Order is used here to designate that study of international relations and world affairs which focuses primarily on the questions of how to reduce significantly the likelihood of international violence and to create tolerable conditions of worldwide economic welfare, social justice and ecological stability. In more connotative but less precise terminology the question reads, how to achieve and human life.

So understood, the substantive matters comprehended by world order are a range of actors--world institutions, international organizations, regional arrangements, transnational actors, the nationstate, infra-national groups, and the individual--as they relate to
the following dimensions of world political and community processes:
the following dimensions of world political and community processes:
of pacific settlement, disarmament and arms control, economic development and welfare, the technological and scientific revolutions,
ecological stability, and human and social rights.

Methodologically, the inquiry involves the use of relevant utopias culminating in the statement of the investigator's preferred world.

A relevant utopia consists in projecting a reasonably concrete behavioral model or image of a system of world political and social processes capable of preventing organized international violence and providing adequate worldwide economic welfare, social justice and ecological stability, and a similarly concrete behavioral statement of transition from the present system to the model. Operationally, the use of relevant utopias also involves an analysis of the present system of world political and social processes as they relate to these problems. In addition, relevant utopias must describe in as rigorous a manner as possible, the trends and prognoses with respect to these problems over a one to three decade period. (Within this context relevance means that both the model and the transition must be sufficiently described in behavioral terms so that the intelligent reader as well as the formulator has a reasonable basis for making a statement about the probabilities of the emergence of such a model. It does not mean that the model or utopia is politically feasible).

Transition involves describing how the present system is likely to and/or will be transformed to the projected model or image. In dealing with transition, special emphasis is given to the possibility of system change absent or without recourse to large-scale violence.

A preferred world is a blueprint of a recommended structure, and recommended guidelines and steps for achieving that structure in order

Definition of World Order

-2-

to maximize world order values, described again in reasonably concrete behavioral terms. It is from testing alternative world order models and transition processes, structures and strategies (that is from a set of relevant utopias) that the investigator is able to select or invent from various facets of these relevant utopias, his preferred world.

Throughout the inquiry formalized authoritative structures and processes of world legal order are given special emphasis, especially as they relate to relevant political, economic and social processes and structures which militate for and against achieving and maintaining the underlying community of a warless, more just and ecologically stable world.

Finally, a continuous effort needs to be made to state operational definition(s) of "world interest" in terms of the central

June, 1970

Saul H. Mendlovitz

MATRIX FOR STUDY OF WORLD ORDER

VALUES

Maxfmal Hinimal Hinimal

War Prevention - Peace Economic Welfare - Prosperity Social Justice - Dignity

SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS

ACTORS	•		SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS	SIONS.		
(Social Movements, Institutions, Organizations)	Disararaent and Arms Control	Peacek ee ping	Pacific Settlement of Disputes	World Economic Development	Technological and Scientific	Ruman and
World					West Tour	Social Kights
International						
Regional		·				
Transmational						
Nation-State						
Individual						

MATRIX FOR THE STUDY OF WORLD ORDER

World Values with Minimal-Maximal Range

Inter-Actor Violence

(minimization of violence - to - prevention of violence)

Economic Welfare (creation of tolerable conditions - to - maintenance of prosperity)

Social Justice (creation of tolerable conditions - to - maintenance of human dignity)

World Ecological Balance

(restoration of balance - to - preservation of balance)

Individual Alienation

(restoration of identity - to - commitment to achievement of a preferred world system)

Achievement Scale 1 (low) - 5 (high)

Substantive Dimensions— (processes	•	Arm: Pol:	_	ace- epin	Co Re t1	sol	ict u-	l r	Economic Veli	ic	Tec log & S tii	ici	al en-	Env			S T,	oci	al	
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^{*}Social Movements, Institutions, Organizations

III. Commentary

The criticism that could be made by relaxed observers with the luxury of hindsight is virtually unlimited. Why did they forget this? Why didn't they do it that way? They should have examined this, that, and the other issue as well. How easy it is to criticize! But we should pause to consider the magnitude of the task taken on by these highly dedicated scholars. And we should fully appreciate that, building on very little foundation, they have greatly advanced the art and science of world order models design.

The procedures followed in this first World Order Models Project were not planned out in advance by a single commander with total authority over all the resources. A social design process of this kind is deficient if it is not based on the participation of a variety of contributors with diverse views. This means that the participants can be expected to have and to press for a great variety of views on methods as well. The Project Director must have felt on occasion that he was laughably mistitled; that he was more a broker and mediator than a giver of directions. Surely he must have been aware of many of the weakness of the procedure that was followed; he must have known why they were that way; and he must have gained insight as to how some of those problems might be overcome in the future. But even if the failings are forgivable, even if they are already clearly recognized by the participants in the Project, it is nevertheless worth describing some of them in order to help others to profit from that experience.

Most of the difficulties stem from a failure to fully appreciate the limitations on the resources available for the work of the Project. Things that might have been worth doing if resources were unlimited should have

been ruled out in the face of reality. For example, too great an emphasis was placed on scientific research. This was recognized by the Project Director in his questioning of the importance of documenting existing trends, and his argument that we need "to wrench ourselves from history." It is a mistake to press for the rigorous validation of scientific propositions and the detailed certification of existing problems to the point at which that work distracts from, rather than facilitates, the design effort. Intensive empirical research should not be undertaken until it is clear what information is needed, and, equally important, until it is clear what level of precision is needed. In formulating policies with respect to population growth or migration, for example, it may be enough to know simply that populations are likely to grow very substantially, within some broad ranges. Preliminary design work should be done first to determine what empirical questions really matter for the task at hand. Some actions or some designs might be worth recommending regardless of whether the predicted population for 1990 was four billion or ten billion.

Similarly, I am very skeptical about the value of the interviews with the elites. They seem to have been premature. If their purpose was to help the research teams to develop insight and ideas, why take the trouble to go to elites? And weren't the research teams creative enough so that at this early stage they had more than enough ideas of their own to process? If the purpose was to assess reactions to particular proposals, then surely the interviews should have been deferred until the proposals were more fully developed. The reasons for conducting these time-consuming interviews should have been thoroughly worked out well in advance of the investment of effort.

One thing we can learn from WOMP I is the importance of carefully managing and controlling the agenda. It seemed to always grow, and never shrink. The time-compressed review of their many years of work makes it seem as if they kept changing the subject. Did they ever feel that they had come to a satisfactory conclusion on one topic before moving on to the next? And was the next predictable, sensibly following from the last?

Controlling the agenda does not mean that the Director should be constantly dictatorial, allowing no deviations whatsoever from some pre-set list. It means that the working group members should, at the beginning of their work, decide among themselves what the agenda for the forthcoming work should be, and they should all then be prepared to scold one another, and to be scolded, if they wander too far afield. The introduction of new themes during the course of the work should be welcomed, but only if arguments for their relevance can be established.

The best way to develop a coherent agenda is to establish a sharply determined goal for the project. WOMP I might be viewed as a conceptualizing and tool-building effort. WOMP II should be much more firmly oriented to the goal of formulating and selecting among well articulated world order models for the future. The test of relevance of any subsidiary question would then be the extent to which it contributes to the meeting of that major goal. Questions like, say, "how much imbalance should we permit for various regional groupings in terms of economic welfare?" should be ruled out of order, or reformulated, until they can be shown to contribute to the design task at hand. What design would the answer to the particular question help us to formulate? What choice would it help us to make?

Reluctant to exclude anything, social scientists too often display the "all other things are relevant" syndrome, resulting in highly diffuse,

centerless products. World order models designers should insist that, to be taken up, a theme must be shown to be not only relevant, but also significantly more relevant than any other theme which might be examined in its place. Acknowledging their inescapably limited resources, they should be willing to narrow and limit their objectives.

Thus, agenda setting should be the first major phase of the work program. For a design effort, this means deciding what are the questions to be answered. What must be decided in something that is to be counted as a world order model? It was suggested in the first Matrix for Study of World Order that the major aspects of the design were to be these:

Disarmament and Arms Control
Peacekeeping
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
World Economic Development
Technological and Scientific Revolution
Human and Social Rights

The 1970 version of the matrix emphasized these themes:

Arms policy
Peacekeeping
Conflict Resolution
Economic Welfare
Technological and Scientific Revolution
Environment
Social Justice

These matrices do not seem to have been used very much, I think largely because they were produced unilaterally by the Project Director, rather than emerging as a product of joint consultation with the research team. The ambiguities have not been ironed out. What are the <u>design questions</u> posed by the naming of these issues? With these unspecified, there is a great temptation to simply discuss the topic, providing diagnoses and prognoses and generally analyzing the problem, without ever getting around to proposing solutions.

To illustrate what I mean by posing the design questions, consider the matter of arms policy. The design questions contained in that term are those questions which ask what the arms policy arrangements for the future should be. Long before trying to find the answers, the designers should decide which of the following kinds of questions they wish to deal with:

- 1. What quantities and kinds of armaments should be maintained by nation-states (or other political units) in the 1990s?
- 2. If a Global Peacekeeping Force is established, what sorts of armaments should it maintain?
- 3. What methods should be used to inspect for adherence to arms limitation agreements?
- 4. What sanctions should be applied against violators of arms limitation agreements?
- 5. What controls should be established on the manufacture and sale of armaments?
- 6. What should become of existing security alliances? etc., etc.

The same sort of explicit design questions could be prepared for all of the major themes. The next step would be to suggest varieties of possible answers to each question. After formulating these candidate answers as to what kinds of arrangements could be made, the designers would then take up the question of which of them should be made. Of course, it must be recognized that there would be a great deal of interaction among the answers to the different design questions. The parts would have to mesh to form a reasonably coherent whole. The advantage of this sort of decomposition of the design process, however, is that it makes each component step far more manageable. An automobile engine must be designed to fit into the automobile, but this does not mean that the people who design the engine must be the same people who design the fenders. The idea is to have a division of labor, well coordinated.

Planning for the whole project could be made in terms of these design questions. First, broad themes for possible consideration could be reviewed, with some identified as being of core interest (e.g., arms policy, supranational institutions, economic welfare), some identified as interesting because of their association with the core group (e.g., environmental issues might be deemed relevant because of their interaction with questions of economic welfare), and some rejected as distractions from the primary objectives (e.g., studies of urban transportation systems). The major themes could then be decomposed into more concrete design questions, and again some could be identified as crucially important while others are identified as worth ignoring or deferring.

The design questions that are retained could then be sorted out in a variety of ways. One of the first things to do is to decide which questions cluster and interact so much that they must be examined together, and which can be separated from one another for a division of labor. The division of labor works two ways, in time, through the sequencing of the agenda, and in "space" through the distribution of assignments to different simultaneously functioning design teams. The possibilities for spreading the work out should not create the illusion that unlimited amounts of work can be accomplished. Recundancy is valuable in design work. It would probably be far better to have three independently operating teams work on the same cluster of questions, and then compare their results, than to have the three teams work on altogether different issues. In general, more resources devoted to fewer questions will help to assure that those few questions will be answered well. That is likely to be far more valuable than having a great many questions answered superficially.

It is important to appreciate that some parts may be intrinsically worthwhile, even without being integrated into some larger whole. Particular elements such as proposals for peacekeeping arrangements or for delivery of health care services can be valuable in themselves, even without being embedded into a larger system design. The most perfectly designed tractor fender is of no use if it is not connected to a tractor, but on the other hand, an improved design for administrating health services is valuable even if the seabed continues under incoherent administration. In this sense, world order models design is more readily divisible than many other kinds of design tasks. Of course, the designer is still obligated to be sensitive to the ways in which the elements of concern to him interact with other parts of the larger system. He cannot just blithely assume that his part is independent of all the others. Health care administration, for example, is likely to be closely linked to questions of population management, food production and distribution, and a great variety of other management problems.

Just as one should not underestimate the linkages among the elements of the system, one should not overestimate them either. It does no good to insist that everything is tied together and that, therefore, everything must be considered together and at once. That posture is paralyzing and counterproductive. One of the designer's first jobs is to determine how his work can be sensibly divided up into parts, with some questions discarded altogether, some deferred, some turned over to others, some saved for later, and some to be taken up immediately.

IV. Plan

By focusing on a limited variety of themes and problems even individuals or small groups with very modest resources can take up at least a portion of the task of world order models design. The plan sketched here suggests how the design task might be undertaken by advanced undergraduates or graduates in a university seminar, but the plan could be used by others as well.

The procedure may be summarized as follows:

- 1. Plan planning procedures;
- 2. Articulate the design problem;
- 3. Specify the major values to be served;
- 4. Identify possible designs for the future:
- 5. Elaborate the more interesting designs;
- 6. Develop transition strategies;
- 7. Assess likely reactions of other parties;
- 8. Evaluate alternative designs;
- 9. Elaborate the chosen design in detail;
- 10. Do sensitivity analyses (susceptibility to error, disturbances;
- 11. Prepare draft proposal;
- 12. Circulate draft for outside criticism;
- 13. Circulate finished document to interested parties;
- 14. Begin implementation.
- 1. Rather than launching directly into the work, the first major step should be to discuss the procedures that are to be followed, taking full consideration of the time and other resource limitations on the group. The plan may be a modification or elaboration of the one outlined here, or it may be altogether different. The objective should be to produce a document describing the results of the design effort. One way to formulate the plan is to try to decide what the table of contents of that concluding document should look like, and then decide the work schedule under which it is to be written.

This planning step should not be rushed as if it were a mere preliminary. It constitutes a major phase of the overall effort.

- 2. The next step, one of the most critical, is that of deciding what the design problem is. (Of course, all of these steps are highly interconnected.) One approach might be to take up the four interconnected problems of war and peace, population, ecology, and material resources administration described by Richard Falk in <u>This Endangered Planet</u> (New York: Random House, 1971), with that book used to establish a common point of departure for the entire group. Or it might be decided that it would be wiser to develop recommendations in a far more limited domain, on inspection of nuclear tests, for example, or on the constitution of international police forces, or on the possibilities for establishing a global guaranteed minimum food income. After having named the problem, the group should go on to identify the variety of design questions that it raises. As suggested earlier, the group's planning for the design work can then be framed in terms of the clustering and priority ordering of these questions. In one way or another, an agenda should be decided.
- 3. Rather than trying to describe the desired future in very concrete terms at this early stage, the group should instead work for a time at specifying the kinds of qualities the designed future should have. For example, the group might agree that there should be social justice, economic equality, and minimal organized violence. Other values that are dedmed to be important could be added as well. It is useful to have these values specified in relatively concrete terms. For example, it might be decided that annual casualty levels from organized violence should be less than 10,000, that average hife expectancy in all regions should be at least 40 years, that the

highest per capita incomes should be no more than ten times larger than the lowest per capita incomes, that there should be no racial discrimination by official policy, that every individual should be assured of a food intake of at least 600 calories a day, and so on. Of course, these parameters should be taken as rough guidelines rather than as fixed and unalterable requirements. They do not need to be specified in great detail, but only to the extent that is useful in facilitating the design task.

- 4. After some agreement is established about the qualities the designed future should have, a variety of different possible designs might be suggested. At first the group should be uncritically creative, possibly "brainstorming" to produce as rich a variety of ideas as possible. The group might generate a list of ideas, possibly including such things as: global police force, condominium of superpowers, strengthened United Nations, world federalism, regional governments, compulsory adjudication and arbitration, abolition of nation-states, Marxism-Leninism, functionalism, and so on. This list should be regarded as no more than a reminder of a rich variety of ideas, to be sorted out, elaborated, and critically analyzed later. Proposals should not be dismissed at this early stage just because some individual is quick to see one disadvantage or another. All that needs to be established here is whether or not an idea is interesting enough to be developed and assessed later in the design process. This pool of suggestions should, of course, remain open for later additions.
- 5. This raw material must now be given clearer shape. The always inescapable limitations on available working time will be felt very sharply here. Choices will have to be made among the different suggestions, not because of any constraints in the outside world, but because of limitations

on the group's time and other resources. It will be necessary to choose just three or four of the most promising ideas for further elaboration and analysis. This work should produce a small variety of clearly formed designs for meeting the problem that had been selected for study.

- It will then be necessary to explore the political feasibility of these proposals. The question of feasibility should not be decided as an abstract question based simply on the character of the end that is envisioned. Before that question is raised, design work should be undertaken to make each candidate design future as feasible as possible, which means designing the best possible transition strategies. If we should want a certain future to come about, what would be the most effective way to make it come about, given today as the point of departure? Several issues require attention. Who are to be the primary actors? What decisions would they have to make? With what timing? What motivations or incentives would induce them to make the required decisions? What resources would be required? What parties are capable and willing to veto or to interfere with the prescribed changes? How could objectors be induced to accept or to desire the change? The question of transition strategies should be viewed as one of the basic parts of the larger design problem. It is only in reference to this overall design, including both means and ends, that questions of feasibility and desirability are really meaningful.
- 7. The candidate models will need to be evaluated if the working group is to know which to fially advocate. This evaluation should not be confused with the task of assessing the desirability of particular proposals to different outside parties. This desirability to others is a major determinant of the feasibility and desirability of any proposal, but it is not the only determinant.

The problem of assessing the likely reactions of others must be taken very seriously because things that seem obviously beneficial to others often are not seen that way by them. In early stages of design it is reasonable to make educated guesses on how each of the different parties would be likely to respond to particular proposals. As particular models become more fully developed they can be submitted to experts outside the working group who have special knowledge of the views and policies of these parties. Finally, when particular proposals have reached a highly advanced stage, the parties themselves should be consulted for their reactions.

At each stage of advancement in the design process the model should be shaped and altered to increase its desirability to particular parties to the extent that such alterations do not introduce other excessive disadvantages. While the design should be adapted to meet some objections, it will generally not be possible to meet all objections, and attempts to do so may simply be destructive.

8. The purpose of the designer's evaluation effort is to choose among different proposed models where choices need to be made. Where a difficult choice is to be made, the alternatives can be systematically evaluated by listing the advantages and disadvantages of each of them and then comparing their overall qualities.

Often, however, the work of systematic evaluation can be circumvented in sensible ways. It may sometimes be immediately evident to all observers which of several possibilities is the superior one, so that it is not necessary to undertake any elaborate evaluative analysis. On the other hand, if it is found that it is difficult to choose among certain models, that itself may be an early warning that any of them would be difficult to implement. The final proposal should, if possible, be obviously superior to its alternatives.

The proposals should be reexamined to determine whether or not it is really desirable to regard them as mutually exclusive alternatives. Perhaps some of their best features can be combined while their worst features are eliminated. Rather than concentrate on differentiating proposals into separate alternatives from which one must choose, it may be wiser to work on integrating them into composite proposals which are obviously superior to any of the more elementary ones. This is easier to do when working in more concrete terms. To illustrate, when described abstractly a proposal for highly centralized governmental structures may seem wholly incompatible with proposals for decentralized world organization. In dealing with specifics, however, it is possible to make more subtle distinctions. Centralization can be proposed for those particular functions for which that is most advantageous, and decentralized procedures can be proposed where that is most advantageous. One can have both.

- 9. Up to this point, it will have been necessary to specify the details of the different proposals only to the extent that the group finds it necessary for choosing among them. Now, after the group has narround down to a tholes of its one ravorite design, they must begin developing and elaborating the idea. They should reexamine the characterization of the ends that are to be sought and fill in detail on whatever questions remain unanswered. And they should take up questions of implementation in more specific terms, asking what next steps they themselves should take.
- 10. As part of this refinement effort the designers should conduct a "sensitivity analysis" of their proposal to determine the extent to which it might be vulnerable to errors or disturbances or objections. The group members should reexamine their basic analysis of the problem and the arguments

they have made and decide whether errors they might plausibly have made would have serious consequences for the quality of their concluding recommendations. They should reexamine the projections and assumptions on which their argument is based. They should work at anticipating as many different kinds of failures of the proposed design as they can imagine, and where possible design correctives or safeguards. They should examine the stability of the proposed system and ask what consequences would be likely, or even remotely possible, if it should rail. They should review the effects deviant actors might have on the system.

- 11. At this stage a full draft of the final document should be prepared and duplicated, including abstract, table of contents, statement of purpose, a description of the circumstances under which the document came to be written, relevant appendices, and so on. Much of this material should have been written as the work progressed, rather than being saved for the final target dates. The hallmark of thoroughness in this draft would be that questions and objections will have been anticipated and answered as thoroughly as possible.
- 12. This dreft should then be circulated to a small number of outsiders who had been asked earlier if they would be willing to respond with written critical commentaries. Special efforts should be made to obtain reactions from people who are likely to disagree with and oppose the proposal. The draft should then be revised in the light of these criticisms and, then, as time allows, circulated again for fresh commentaries.
- 13. When all this is done, the finished document should be prepared and sent out to a broad range of interested parties, including especially the World Law Fund. A brief cover letter should explain the nature of the

document, solicit reactions, and possibly ask for the reader's support in some other specific ways as well.

14. Steps should be taken to implement the recommendations that have been developed. Failures and difficulties in implementation should not be treated as grounds for resignation, but as feedback information which is useful for guiding new efforts at world order models design.

In some communities several different groups, in and out of the universities, might decide to undertake some portion of this task of designing the future. If some of them agree to take on the same aspect of the larger problem, they can coordinate their work in a variety of ways. Occasional exchanges through face-to-face meetings or through exchanges of individual members would be useful at the early stages to help establish common understandings of the nature of the problem. After that, however, they should work out their ideas separately, and not engage in extensive interaction until they are ready to exchange rough drafts. If possible, they should plan to work on combining these independent drafts into one final document which combines the best qualities of all of them.

A single large seminar could be managed in a similar way. Instead of having all of the group members work together, locking onto one common set of ideas, it may be advantageous if they were divided into several independent subgroups, at least in the stages between the selection of the problem and the completion of the first draft.

The procedure that has been described here may seem like a smooth linear progression, but in practice it will be found that later insights will, quite properly, lead to revisions of earlier decisions. The outline

that has been suggested is intended only as a basis for getting started. It should not be constraining. The procedures can be adapted in any number of ways to suit particular circumstances and desires. For example, if an instructor handles a seminar on Designing the Future World year after year, instead of having each class begin over again, he can have next year's class begin with the documents and ideas produced by this year's class. One or two members of the earlier seminar might be willing to visit the first few meetings of the new group to share the wisdom of their old-hand experience. The design problem can be defined more narrowly right from the outset to accommodate particular interests. Courses devoted specifically, to, say, population problems or to mineral resource management can follow much the same format. Some groups might wish to focus on specific actors, asking what might be done by this particular government or that particular organization.

Exercises of this kind can produce good recommendations for action and improved designs for the future. By challenging participants to face up to and actually manage major problems, the work is likely to produce subtle understanding of a depth unattainable in conventional teaching formats. These exercises can liberate imaginations. Possibly most important of all, this work can produce a new sense of efficacy, a sense that all of us can indeed participate in designing a better world order for the future.